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Abstract—Attack Graphs are an important support for assess-
ment and subsequent improvement of network security. They
reveal possible paths an attacker can take to break through
security perimeters and traverse a network to reach valuable
assets deep inside the network. Although scalability is no longer
the main issue, Attack Graphs still have some problems that
make them less useful in practice. First, Attack Graphs remain
difficult to relate to the network topology. Second, Attack Graphs
traditionally only consider the exploitation of vulnerable hosts.
Third, Attack Graphs do not rely on automatic identification of
potential attack targets. We address these gaps in our MsAMS
(Multi-step Attack Modelling and Simulation) tool, based on
Mobile Ambients. The tool not only allows the modelling of more
static aspects of the network, such as the network topology, but
also the dynamics of network attacks. In addition to Mobile
Ambients, we use the PageRank algorithm to determine targets
and hub scores produced by the HITS (Hypertext Induced
Topic Search) algorithm to guide the simulation of an attacker
searching for targets.
Index Terms—Network Security, Vulnerability Assessment,
Attack Modelling, PageRank, HITS.
I. INTRODUCTION
A computer network is an ever changing environment. New
business agreements trigger changes in firewall rules. New net-
work functionalities trigger the configuration of new servers,
new network services, and new users increasing the chance of
introducing mis-configurations in the network. Additionally,
patches are not always available and, even when they are, it
may not be cost-effective to patch all vulnerabilities present in
a network. Hence, a network is hardly free from opportunities
for attackers, and needs to be assessed constantly.
Attackers take advantage of reachable vulnerabilities in
COTS (Commercial-Of-The-Shelf) and open source software
components and of exposures 1 as stepping stones to penetrate
a network. Each step opens further opportunities by exposing
more hosts, and attackers can progress this way until targets
are reached. Early Model Checker approaches [2], [3] suffered
from severe scalability problems due to the state explosion
problem [4]. Since then, Attack Graphs algorithms have
evolved to exploit-based approaches which take advantage of
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1A vulnerability is a mistake in software which hackers can use directly to
access protected data, while an exposure provides information or capabilities
that can function as stepping-stones for direct access to protected data [1].
dependencies between vulnerabilities, later simplified by the
access-to-effect paradigm [5], [6]. Exploit-based approaches
are supported by the assumption of monotonicity [7] which
means that once a resource is acquired by an attacker it is
never released. Several customised Attack Graph algorithms
by researchers [5]–[11] and commercial initiatives [12] have
been proposed, some scaling to thousands of hosts [5], [10].
However, although scalability is no longer the main issue, there
are three other areas where improvement is still needed:
1) Attack graphs are still difficult to understand by people
since they do not fully represent the network topology
needed to relate attack paths identified in the graph
to the network itself, and to support decisions about
countermeasures. Approaches to this problem rely on
Aggregation [13], [14] or Clusterization [15] of graph
nodes, but these approaches still suffer from the problem
that firewalls are only used for calculation of reachability
and not clearly represented in the graph. Therefore, if
several firewalls are traversed by an attacker it may be
difficult, e.g., to identify which ones should be changed.
2) Steps in an attack graph are typically generated by
matching post- and preconditions of subsequent attack
steps [5]–[11] but (i) acquisition, movement or replica-
tion of resources cannot always be represented in terms
of pre/postcondition pairs, and (ii) pre/postcondition
pairs are memoryless whereas attackers may gain access
due to resources acquired more than one step ago. There
is a need for attack dynamics.
3) Some algorithms to generate attack graphs consider all
possible attack paths. Hence, it is if every node in the
network would be a potential target [5]. Other algo-
rithms require the explicit indication of targets, either
by naming a specific target [10], [12] or by assuming
that asset values are given [16]. In line with this last
approach, we assume, like other researchers (e.g. [17]),
that attackers are rational and search for assets which
represent some value. However, business valuation of
assets is a complex, time-consuming process. Therefore,
for large networks, asset values are usually not available.
From these observations we derive a list of requirements we
would like to address in our proposed solution:
R1 The network topology should be fully represented in the
attack graph.
R2 The algorithm should allow for attack dynamics.
R3 The algorithm should make reasonable automatic estima-
tion of which network nodes are targets.
A. Contribution
We address these current deficiencies in Attack Graphs
by proposing MsAMS, a tool for modelling and simulation
of network attacks, the design of which draws heavily on
Cardelli’s work on Mobile Ambients [18], [19] and formal biol-
ogy [20], and on Milner’s work on bigraphs [21]. Specifically,
we address R1 and R2 by applying the concept of Mobile
Ambients to the domain of networks, and R3 with Google’s
PageRank algorithm [22].
We have chosen Ambients because they allow the represen-
tation of a network as a graph of nested nodes. They also
allow the representation of any type of resources, such as
firewalls, routers, hosts, services, vulnerabilities, privileges,
users, attackers, and credentials. This way, we are able to
fully represent the topology of a network since hierarchy and
grouping is intrinsic to Mobile Ambients. Ambients have capa-
bilities which allow them to move. Furthermore, ambients can
interact with other ambients depending on their capabilities.
These two features allow the representation of attack dynamics
without compromising scalability. Finally, by replacing asset
value by asset connectivity we are able to define automatically
a set of targets without relying on valuations of all assets in a
network, which is not readily available, as we observed above.
PageRank algorithm returns high authority scores for graph
nodes with many inlinks. If a network node with high number
of inlinks is compromised it may affect a high number of other
nodes which depend on it. Therefore, based on this rationale,
we assume that high authority nodes are network nodes to be
protected, i.e. they are targets.
In this paper, we extend [23] in many ways. We review the
modelling of the running example, introduce a new example,
and provide more details on how we achieve requirements
R1, R2 and R3, such as, how we capture network locality
and connectivity (Section VI), how virtual links are processed
(Section VIII), and how we use ranking algorithms (Sec-
tion IX).
II. OVERVIEW OF MSAMS (MULTI-STEP ATTACK
MODELLING AND SIMULATION)
MsAMS is a tool which requires as input (i) the network
configuration, including filtering rules, (ii) vulnerabilities in
COTS present in the network, which can be obtained automat-
ically from vulnerability scanning tools, (iii) their attributes,
which can be obtained from vulnerability databases such as
the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [24], and (iv) the
location of the attacker (e.g. inside or outside the network).
Additionally, and at the discretion of the network administra-
tor, Access Control Lists (ACLs) from services can also be
used, to assess potential attacks which exploit credential theft
and trust relationships. These input allow the tool to build
an ambient-based model of the network. After the model is
complete, MsAMS simulates an attacker (also an Ambient )
dynamically acquiring resources and searching for attack paths
allowed by the modelled ambients and their embedded rules.
Therefore, MsAMS produces attack traces which represent
possible multi-step attack paths, as output.
III. CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF A NETWORK
We borrow from the concept of Mobile Ambients, which
is a calculus that allows us to define places (i.e. ambients)
where computation happens and to express movement of
processes [18]. We view a network as an Ambient which
contains other Ambients i.e hosts, subnets and firewalls, which
recursively may contain other Ambients. Therefore, a subnet is
an ambient which contains several other ambients representing
hosts; a firewall is also an ambient which protects ambients by
filtering communication between ambients outside its bound-
aries and protected ambients contained within its boundaries.
A host contains interfaces which allow interactions with other
hosts, internal or external to the network. Interfaces may be
ports allowing access to services, or application interfaces,
such as login to the Operating System (OS) or web browsers;
these interfaces may contain vulnerabilities. According to pre-
vious study of the NVD [25] only an insignificant percentage
of vulnerabilities require credentials, hence, we assume that
vulnerabilities represent an opportunity for attackers to enter a
host without the need for credentials (e.g. password or private
session key). However, some interfaces require themselves
credentials, e.g., SSH service and OS login.
We use a simple vulnerability model based on access
required for its exploitation and effect resulting from its
successful exploitation. Thus, the access can be either of
the type “network” which means the vulnerability can be
exploited remotely, opposed to the type “local” which means
the vulnerability can only be exploited if the attacker is
authenticated, via an interface, on the host. The effect of a
vulnerability can be of the type Privilege Gained (i.e. “user”
or “admin” privilege over the OS) or Impact. In this paper, we
restrict ourselves to the use of vulnerabilities which result in
privilege acquisition.
We use exposures to represent stealthy ways to acquire
credentials. An attacker can get remote or local access to
a host by means of vulnerabilities but, most of the time,
he does not automatically obtain credentials for that host.
Thus, an exposure is an abstraction to model the availability
of credentials by means e.g. of social engineering, clear-text
passwords saved locally, or via key stroke mechanisms. A
credential obtained from an exposure in one host may allow an
attacker to further access non-vulnerable hosts in the network.
IV. ABSTRACTING A NETWORK AS AMBIENTS
As defined by Cardelli [18]–[20] an ambient has a name,
a list of ambients contained within it, and a list of processes
running in it. Therefore, an ambient could contain non-ambient
processes and sub-ambients. We simplify this approach for the
domain of network attacks by considering that an ambient only
contains sub-ambients and each (sub-)ambient may contain
a list of processes running on its boundaries which execute
actions. A process may execute (i) movement actions, (ii)
communication actions, (iii) resource-acquisition actions, and
(iv) replication action. We consider that each action executed
on an ambient provides the ambient with a capability, which
happens at the level of ambient, not at the level of process.
Thus, although in Cardelli’s work only movement actions are
regulated by capabilities, we take that all actions are regulated
by capabilities, and actions are always inter-ambients. Besides,
there are action-rules which define how the execution of
actions should happen; by default all actions are executed in
parallel and only once, otherwise when specified, they can be
executed sequentially (called “paths” in [19]) and repeatedly.
We define Ambient as follows.
Definition 1: An ambient named Amb is defined as
Amb:[AmbientList][ActRuleList], where AmbientList is a
list of ambients, and ActRuleList is a list of action-rules
executed in parallel at the boundaries of Amb.
Definition 2: An action-rule ActRule is an expression of
the following form.
1) Repeat Act: this action-rule repeats action Act indefi-
nitely.
2) Seq Acti Actj : this action-rule performs Acti followed
by Actj .
Definition 3: An action Act is an expression of the follow-
ing form.
1) Movement Actions
a) Enter Ambi: an ambient Amb with this capabil-
ity is able to enter in ambient Ambi; potentially
acquiring access to ambients contained in Ambi.
b) Accept Ambi: an ambient Amb with this capa-
bility is able to accept the entry of Ambi in its
boundaries; potentially allowing Ambi to acquire
access to ambients contained in it.
c) AllowIn Ambi Ambj : an ambient Amb with this
capability allows that Ambi moves through its
boundaries to gain access to Ambj .
2) Communication Actions
a) Out Ambi: an ambient Amb with this capability is
able to send messages/requests to ambient Ambi.
b) In Ambi: an ambient Amb with this capability is
able to respond to messages/requests from ambient
Ambi.
3) Resource-Acquisition Actions
a) ReleaseCred Ambi: an ambient Amb with this ca-
pability is able to release the credential represented
by ambient Ambi.
b) AcquireCred Ambi: an ambient Amb with this
capability is able to request acquisition of the
credential represented by ambient Ambi.
4) Replication Action
a) Replicate: an ambient Amb with this capability
is able to produce one replica of itself, generating
another ambient Amb′ identical to ambient Amb.
Note that Cardelli’s primitive capabilities, “in” (corresponds
to an Enter Amb), “open”, “exit”, and later “accept” [20] can
be used to derive composed capabilities, such as “allow in”,
“acquire” and “release” [18]. Thus, AllowIn is derived from
“in” which causes active ambients to move, plus “open” which
dissolves Amb from the outside revealing its content. We
adapted Cardelli’s “acquire” and “release” which in his work is
derived from “open” to the domain of network attacks. As we
will see on Section XI, our “AcquireCred” and “ReleaseCred”
is a composition of “Enter” and “Accept”. Note also that we
did not identify the need for capabilities “open” and “exit”
yet, that is why it was not incorporated into MsAMS. Thus,
we assume that exit of an ambient is by default permitted, and
that ambients’ boundaries are never dissolved.
A. Matching Capabilities
The actions which potentially allow movement, communi-
cation and resource-acquisition (described above) will only
happen if a match between Capabilities occur. Similar to
ambients applied to biology [20], these actions require syn-
chronisation between two ambients, in our case, determined
by a common ambient name. This synchronisation is achieved
by means of reduction rules between: (i) Enter and Accept, (ii)
Out and In, (iii) ReleaseCred and AcquireCred, and (iv) Enter
and AllowIn. Fig. 1 illustrates an Enter/Accept reduction rule
resulting in ambient m successfully entering inside ambient
n. We use our notation and a graphical notation inspired by
BioAmbients [20].
m n n
Enter n Accept m m
m: [] [Enter "n"] n: ["m"][]n: [] [Accept "m"]|
Fig. 1. Enter/Accept reduction rule which allows ambient move
V. RUNNING EXAMPLE
We use the network illustrated in Fig. 2 from Ingols et al. [5]
as the basis for introducing core concepts and the method used
by the MsAMS tool.
In this example network the attacker is initially located on
host A and wants to reach either host E or F. The firewall
only allows traffic from host C or D to host E. Additionally,
all hosts have a single open port with a vulnerable service
running. Each vulnerability is remotely exploitable and allows
the attacker to gain privileged access to the host.
The example network can be represented in terms of Am-
bient as illustrated in Fig. 3(a).
Fig. 2. An example network
The figure shows ambient net, containing five ambients
A,B,C,D, FW , which represent hosts A to D and firewall
FW . The firewall is viewed as a membrane protecting am-
bients, i.e. hosts E and F . Fig. 3(b) provides a zoom view
of host A, which contains an ambient representing a listening
service sv A, which in turn contains an ambient representing
a vulnerability v A on that service. Additionally, ambient
A contains (i) an ambient admin A representing privilege
of root (unix-based hosts) or administrator (windows-based
hosts), and (ii) an ambient OS A representing the host OS
or kernel. The choice of entities to represent depends on
what is relevant to model. For example, in this case v A
is a vulnerability of the type remote-to-admin, that is why
admin A is relevant.
B D E FA C
FW
net
(a) The example network
A
OS_A
sv_A
v_A
admin_A
(b) Zoom in host A
Fig. 3. Modelling the example network as Ambients
VI. CAPTURING NETWORK LOCALITY AND
CONNECTIVITY
This section describes how we fulfil requirement R1.
The topology of the example network illustrated as Ambi-
ents in Fig. 3 is now represented in a tree structure, shown
in Fig. 4. It defines the locality of ambients in Milner’s
terminology [21], henceforth called Locality Tree. Children
nodes of ambients B−D and F , although not fully represented
in the figure, are similar to A.
The connectivity of the network defines a hypergraph H =
{N,E}, the Connectivity Hypergraph, where N is the set of
nodes:
N = {net,A,B,C,D,E, F, FW, sv A, admin A, ...}
and E is the set of hyperedges:
E = {e1 = {net,A,B,C,D, FW}, e2 = {E,F},
e3 = {A, sv A, admin A,OS A}, e4 = {v A}, ...}
Hyperedges referring to hosts B, C, D, E and F have been
omitted because they are similar to e3 and e4.
Note that the nesting of nodes, i.e. of Ambients, is captured
via the Locality Tree, while each hyperedge represents fully-
connected environments.
VII. CAPTURING NETWORK DYNAMICS
This section describes how we fulfil requirement R2.
We have seen in Section V the network topology of the
example network, i.e the ambients locality, and the hypergraph
corresponding to the connectivity of the network. So far, we
have addressed mostly the static aspect of the network. Now
we specify the Ambients with their action-rules which deter-
mine the dynamic behaviour of the ambients, how they can
interact. The ActRuleList, as defined in Section IV, is a list
Fig. 4. Locality Tree for example network shown in Fig. 3
of action-rules executed as parallel compositions. Therefore,
an ActRuleList of the type [Repeat Acti, Repeat Actj] means
repeat Acti indefinitely and repeat Actj indefinitely.
1 net: ["A" "B" "C" "D" "FW"] []
2 FW: ["E" "F"] [Repeat (AllowIn "C" "sv_E"),
Repeat (AllowIn "D" "sv_E")]
3 A: ["sv_A" "admin_A" "OS_A"]
[Repeat (AllowIn "net" "sv_A")]
4 sv_A: ["v_A"] [Repeat (Accept "net"),
Repeat (Out "OS_A")]
5 v_A: [] [Repeat (Accept "sv_A")]
6 admin_A: [] [Repeat (Accept "v_A"),
Repeat (Enter "OS_A")]
7 OS_A: [] [Repeat (Accept "admin_A"),
Repeat (In "sv_A")]
similar rules as 3-7 apply to ambients B-F
Rule 1 defines that ambient net contains ambients A, B,
C, D and FW , but no action-rules.
The Capability AllowIn used in the second rule captures the
firewall rules, restricting the traffic of messages from outside
to inside its boundaries. In the example, the firewall allows
only that ambients coming from hosts C and D access the
service in host E, i.e. sv E.
Rule 3 defines that host A allows any traffic from net to
its service sv A. The capability AllowIn in this case performs
the role of a port which gives access to its service. We can
also think that it represents a host-based firewall governing
traffic allowed into and out of the host.
As we have seen, host A contains a listening service sv A
which contains a vulnerability v A. This service accepts
ambients from net into its boundaries meaning that the
service accepts requests from the net, and possibly from the
internet if we had represented it here. Service requests give
the opportunity of exploiting v A. That’s why v A accepts
sv A, meaning that once in sv A, vulnerability v A becomes
available, as specified in rules 4 and 5.
Rule 4 also defines that service sv A can make requests to
OS A, which represents, e.g., the kernel of a Linux system
and all services it can provide for someone with admin
privileges over A. Thus, on the one hand service sv A can
make requests, represented by its capability Out “OS A” and,
on the other hand, OS A can answer service requests coming
from service sv A, represented by capability In “sv A” in
rule 7.
The ambient admin A represents the privilege of admin
(root or administrator) acquired over the host. The meaning
of this privilege is evident by the fact that an ambient in
admin A, e.g. an attacker, can Enter “OS A” (rule 6) and
OS A accepts it (rule 7), allowing the attacker to take full
advantage of host A OS.
All the other hosts have similar rules as 3-7 specified for
host A, including hosts E and F . Hence, all hosts have
one AllowIn “net” on their service action rules. These rules
characterise the network behaviour, i.e. all network traffic, for
the example network. Note that the action-rules for ambient
FW come from the firewall rules, and can be retrieved
automatically. Other ambients follow some patterns which
can be duplicated (automatically). For example, all services
containing the same type of vulnerability (e.g. remote-to-
admin) are defined the same way, and this information can be
retrieved from scanning tools and the NVD. Hence, in practise,
the majority of the ambients can be specified automatically,
and the network administrator has only to specify a few critical
servers manually.
VIII. PROCESSING VIRTUAL LINKS
So far, we have seen, in Section VI, how we capture a
network topology via (i) locality tree, and how we capture
network connectivity via (ii) connectivity hypergraph. Besides,
we have also seen how the dynamics of the network are
specified in terms of (iii) ambients action rules in Section VII.
In this section, we describe how we capture what we call
Virtual Links from (i) and (iii), introducing the concept of
Least Common Ancestor. Note that the computation of these
links allows us to build a matrix of links, as described in
Section IX.
Definition 4: There’s a directed Virtual Link from Ambi
to Ambj when: (i) Ambj has an Accept “Ambk” where Ambk
is an ancestor of Ambi, and (ii) there is an Allow path letting
Ambi into Ambk.
An Allow path letting Ambi into Ambk is a path that would
allow Ambi to exit to the Least Common Ancestor of Ambi
and Ambk, and let it enter through successive firewalls into
Ambk. Note that, as mentioned in Section IV, “exit” to an
ambient is by default permitted, and currently not incorporated
into MsAMS.
Definition 5: Least Common Ancestor of two ambients
lca(Ambi, Ambk) is the first ancestor that ambients Ambi
and Ambk have in common on the Locality Tree.
For example, according to Fig. 4, we have: lca(sv E, F ) ⇒
FW and lca(v A, admin E) ⇒ net.
A virtual link between ambients X and Y is created if X
can actually move into Y . Let’s take as an example the firewall
FW . Although sv E accepts traffic from net, meaning that
potentially an ambient coming from A−D can reach sv E,
the firewall restricts this possibility to ambients coming from
C or D. Hence, we have in fact two virtual (directed) links
C → sv E and D → sv E. The following algorithm
processes Virtual Links of a modelled network, according to
this rationale.
for each Y
for each ActRule in Y: Accept "X" or In "X"
follow the path from Y to lca(X,Y),
and test if X is allowed in through
each node in the path
IX. COMPUTING RANKS USING THE MATRIX OF
NETWORK LINKS
This section shows how we fulfil requirement R3.
So far, we can represent an attacker as an Ambient that
can travel through the network according to action-rules.
However, the attacker up to now moves at random, only bound
by permitted moves. In this section, we describe how we
determine targets automatically and how we calculate authority
and hub scores. This way, we are able to incorporate rationality
to attackers moves by guiding their search toward valuable
assets (i.e. targets) with preference to lower cost moves (i.e.
high hub scores) when more than one move is possible. More
in detail, we borrow from Link Analysis Ranking 2 for two
tasks which support the simulation of attackers, described in
Section X:
1) We use Google’s PageRank algorithm [22] to identify
a set of target nodes. Large authority scores returned
by the algorithm represent network nodes with large
number of inlinks, i.e. nodes that will affect a large
number of other nodes if compromised. We assume these
nodes should be protected, and thus, represent targets for
attackers. Note that our virtual links, described in the
previous section, are directed links. Hence, the notion
of inlinks and outlinks apply to them as it happens with
webpages.
2) We use HITS (Hypertext Induced Topic Search) algo-
rithm [26], basis of Teoma search engine, to compute
scores used for searching for attack paths. HITS relies
on the assumption that a webpage with many inlinks
has a high authority score and a webpage with many
outlinks has a high hub score. Besides, each page is
an authority and a hub to a certain extent, and as a
consequence, each page has both scores. It is further
assumed that “Good authorities are pointed to by good
hubs and good hubs point to good authorities” [27, Page
115]. We take advantage of HITS scores to simulate
a rational attacker giving preference for hubbiest steps,
whenever alternative moves are available.
From the virtual links obtained as shown in the previous
section, we create an adjacency matrix L where Lij is one,
if there is a link from ambient i to ambient j, and zero,
otherwise. This is a n×n, where n is the number of ambients
modelled, which is sparse since we only represent links which
are enabled via capabilities and locality, and do not represent
links resulting from connectivity.
2This field of research deals with the prioritization of search results using
the link structure of web pages.
A. PageRank for Computing Targets Automatically.
The PageRank value (PR) of an ambient Ambi is propor-
tional to the sum of PR values of its inlinking ambients Ambj .
The ~PR is obtained efficiently via power method [27, Chapter
4] applied to the matrix G, as shown in (1).
~PR
(k+1)T
= ~PR
(k)T
G, (1)
where G = αH + (α~a+ (1− α)~e)1/n ~eT
Thus, matrix G is computed by means of the sparse matrix
|n|×|n| of links H where Hij is 1|Ambi| if there is a link from
ambient i to ambient j and zero, otherwise. Note that matrix
H has the same structure as matrix L (as seen above), but
non-zero values are different; in L non-zero elements are ones,
while in H non-zero elements are probabilities. The parameter
α ∈ [0, 1] is the damping factor, which conveys the idea of
random walk. The damping factor α for an ambient-based
graph still represents this notion. Thus, α is the probability that
the attacker will follow one of the outlinks from the present
node, 1 − α being the probability that the attacker abandons
or starts the attack over again to follow another previously
unexplored path.
Vector ~a contains one if ambient i is a dangling node,
i.e. if it contains no outlinks, and zero otherwise. It corrects
dangling ambients (nodes) by given 1|n| equal probability that
any ambient is selected from it. Vector ~e is a column vector
of ones, ~eT is the transpose of vector e, n is the number of
ambients while PRT is a row vector containing the PageRank
scores, after convergence.
The PageRank vector for the running example illustrated
in Fig. 3 is obtained after 13 iterations (α = 0.6). From this
vector, we select t ambients with the higher scores for the
target set. Note that the top two scores (t = 2) are OS E
(0.05820134) and admin E (0.06054866), which correspond
to the intuition of asset value since the compromise of host
E turns impossible the communication from net to the hosts
protected by the firewall.
B. HITS for Computation of Hubs.
Authority ~xk and hub ~yk scores, used to simulate a rational
attacker, are calculated using (2) and (3), respectively, where
IN is the set of inlinks of ambient Ambi, OUT is the set of
outlinks of Ambi, and k is the iteration counter.
~xk(Ambi) =
∑
Ambj∈INAmbi
~y(k−1)(Ambj) (2)
~yk(Ambi) =
∑
Ambj∈OUTAmbi
~xk(Ambj) (3)
The summations (2) and (3) are also resolved by power
method [27, Chapter 11] applied to the matrix resulting
from the multiplication of matrix L and its transpose LT :
LTL (called authority matrix) or LLT (called hub matrix).
Authority scores are obtained resolving (4) and hub scores
are obtained resolving (5), where L is the matrix of zeros
and ones containing the virtual links between every pair of
ambients Ambi and Ambj , as described in Section VIII.
~xk = ~yk−1LTL (4)
~yk = ~xk−1LLT (5)
X. SIMULATION OF ATTACKERS
The simulation engine is in reality the execution of com-
puting agents, i.e. ambients which actively move through the
Locality Tree according to the Matrix of Network Links L,
defined in Section VIII, and the Connectivity Hypergraph,
defined in Section VI. These agents search for valuable assets
(i.e. high PageRank scores) giving preference to lower cost
moves (i.e. high hub scores).
An attacker Ambient can be assigned as a computing Agent,
more precisely “they [agents] are confined to ambients” as
defined by Cardelli [18]. A computation is run by executing
in parallel a list of actions defined by the Ambient of each
computing Agent. Thus, at each step, a computing Agent
executes one Action (non-deterministic choice) defined by its
action-rule list. Each of these steps can either be accepted, if
the attacker (ambient) actions and the other ambients actions
match, as described in Section IV-A, or rejected if the actions
do not match. A match means that the attacker can actually
perform the step, and this is recorded by the simulation engine
as a move from the attacker. In the end, the engine provides the
attacker complete trace up to a target. This trace is a possible
multi-step attack on the modelled network. An attacker trace
for the running example (see Fig. 3) is illustrated next.
Enter "sv_D"
Enter "sv_E" (through FW:[AllowIn "D" "sv_E"]
through E:[AllowIn "net" "sv_E"]
through sv_E:[Accept "net"])
Enter "v_E"
Enter "admin_E"
This trace shows the possible attack ADE. Note that the
trace indicates if a firewall is traversed to facilitate relating
the output path with the actual network path. Note also that
vulnerabilities V A and v D were not exploited because the
attacker had more incentive to look for vulnerability v E
which leads to admin E.
XI. MODIFIED RUNNING EXAMPLE:
REQUESTING/ACQUIRING CREDENTIALS
This section aims to show how the acquisition of credentials
by an attacker happens. For this purpose, we now consider
the running example, illustrated in Fig. 2, with hosts A and
C modified. A has a vulnerability remote-to-user and has an
exposure which reveals the admin password (pAdmin A) of
host A for any ambient which enters it. Host C is no longer
vulnerable, and it has a service running, let’s say SSH , used
to administer the host remotely. Administrator Bob is able to
do so from host A. Fig. 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate these changes.
The modified host A is specified as follows.
1 A: ["sv_A" "user_A" "admin_A" "OS_A"
A
sv_A
v_A
admin_A
OS_A
user_A
exp_A
Bob pAdmin_A
(a) Zoom in host A
C
sv_C
admin_C
OS_C
pAdmin_C
(b) Zoom in host C
Fig. 5. Modified running example shown in Fig. 2
"exp_A"]
[Repeat (AllowIn "net" "sv_A")]
2 sv_A: ["v_A"] [Repeat (Accept "net"),
Repeat (Out "OS_A")]
3 v_A: [] [Repeat (Accept "sv_A")]
4 exp_A: [] [Repeat (Accept "user_A"),
Repeat (ReleaseCred "pAdmin_A")]
5 user_A: [] [Repeat (Accept "v_A"),
Repeat (Out "OS_A"]
6 admin_A: [] [Repeat (Accept "pAdmin_A"),
Repeat (Enter "OS_A")]
7 OS_A: [] [Repeat (In "user_A"),
Repeat (In "sv_A"),
Repeat (Accept "admin_A")]
8 Bob: [] [Repeat (Enter "pAdmin_A")]
9 pAdmin_A: [] [Repeat (Accept "Bob")]
And the modified host C as follows.
1 C: ["sv_A" "OS_C" "admin_C"]
[Repeat (AllowIn "net" "sv_C")]
2 sv_C: [] [Repeat (Accept "pAdmin_C"),
Repeat (Accept "pAdmin_A"),
Repeat (Out "OS_C")]
3 admin_C: [] [Repeat (Accept "sv_C"),
Repeat (Enter "OS_C")]
4 OS_C: [] [Repeat (Accept "admin_C"),
Repeat (In "sv_C")]
5 pAdmin_C: [] []
The SSH service in host C (sv C) now requires passwords
represented by ambients pAdmin C and pAdmin A (rule 2),
while before (as shown in Section VII) it accepted any ambient
within ambient net.
If a computing agent, ambient attacker, happens to issue (at
simulation time) an action rule AcquireCred ”pAdmin A”,
then a reduction rule between ReleaseCred and AcquireCred
occurs, as illustrated in Fig. 6.
attacker: [] [AcquireCred "pAdmin_A"]
attacker: [] [Enter "pAdmin_A"]
exp_A: [] [ReleaseCred "pAdmin_A"]
pAdmin_A: [] [Accept "attacker"]
|
Fig. 6. Reduction rule between actions ReleaseCred and AcquireCred
Note that the acquisition of Action Enter “pAdmin A” by
the ambient attacker allows the attacker to use credential
pAdmin A for the remaining of the computation, i.e. until
the engine stops when a target is reached. This is an advantage
over approaches which rely on pre/postconditions.
XII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The time for computing an attack is dominated by the
computation of assets’ ranks and hub scores. This is performed
by an algorithm based on the PageRank algorithm [27],
and the query-independent HITS algorithm [26]. A naı¨ve
implementation of either PageRank or HITS can take O(n3),
demanding a O(n2) matrix multiplication in each cycle. A
more efficient implementation, however, takes into account the
fact that the adjacency matrix is sparse and that the matrix
multiplication performed in each cycle can be executed in
O(n). Assuming that n is the number of ambients represented,
our implementation precomputes the matrix in O(n2), and
then applies ranking algorithm in time that ranges from O(kn)
to O(kn2), depending on the density of the adjacency matrix
and on k, the number of iterations necessary for convergence
of the power method applied to the computation of either
PageRank or HITS. It is important to notice that even for
a matrix with billions of nodes the PageRank algorithm tends
to converge in less than a hundred iteration. In our tests
it converged in less than 60 cycles for a test with 8000
nodes. In a previous implementation [28] we used a full
matrix multiplication and fixed k, obtaining running times
of O(n3) when using more than 8000 nodes. Currently, we
have an implementation in Haskell using a sparse matrix
multiplication and a matrix akin to the Google matrix [27].
The whole process of both ranking (with HITS and PageRank)
and searching for an attack executes in less than 30 seconds
for a network with more than 8000 nodes.
We modified the running example illustrated in Fig. 3 for
our experiments. Thus, we used the following configuration
of nodes to the left and right of the firewall, respectively:
(4,512), (8,1024), (16,2048), (32,4096), and (64,8192). That
choice generates a dense adjacency sub-matrix for the part
of the model representing the right side of the firewall. All
experiments assumed the attacker positioned initially inside
host A. Fig. 7 shows the computing time for these experiments,
performed on machine with Intel Core 2 Duo T5250, 1.5GHz
processor, 2GB RAM.
We express the network models input of our tool in a
dedicated language that has also been implemented in Haskell.
The 8256 nodes’ network used in the experiments, e.g., is
described in this language with just 46 lines. It takes 7.18
seconds to compile those lines into the internal representation
used by PageRank and HITS algorithms.
XIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented MsAMS (Multi-step Attack Modelling and
Simulation), a tool which implements Mobile Ambients ap-
plied to the domain of network attacks, and two Link Analysis
Ranking algorithms: PageRank and HITS. MsAMS satisfies
the three requirements identified in Section I, since (i) it allows
capturing the exact topology of the network, fulfilling R1, as
seen in Section VI, (ii) it allows representing attack dynamics,
fulfilling R2, as seen in Sections VII, X and XI, and (iii)
it determines network targets automatically, fulfilling R3, as
seen in Section IX. This is achieved without compromising
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Fig. 7. Performance of the MsAMS tool
performance, as seen in Section XII. Besides, the approach
is flexible since the level of details modelled is left at the
discretion of the network administrator; he can focus on one
specific aspect or on the entire network.
We have many plans for future work. Among them, we
would like to have a graphical interface to show input and
output in terms of ambients, and would like to experiment
with weighted ranking algorithms (e.g. [29]). This way we
could cover the case of hosts with high business value but
low number of incoming links. Finally, our choice of attackers
actions is currently non-deterministic. However, stochastic
choice [20], based on risk indicators, would be even better.
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